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Abstract
A (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor is a function nmExt : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1} that takes two
inputs, a weak source X ∼ {0, 1}n of min-entropy k and an independent uniform seed s ∈ {0, 1}d,
and outputs a bit nmExt(X, s) that is ε-close to uniform, even given the seed s and the value
nmExt(X, s′) for an adversarially chosen seed s′ 6= s. Dodis and Wichs (STOC 2009) showed the
existence of (k, ε)-non-malleable extractors with seed length d = log(n− k− 1) + 2 log(1/ε) + 6
that support sources of entropy k > log(d) + 2 log(1/ε) + 8.
We show that the foregoing bound is essentially tight, by proving that any (k, ε)-non-
malleable extractor must satisfy the entropy bound k > log(d) + 2 log(1/ε) − log log(1/ε) − C
for an absolute constant C. In particular, this implies that non-malleable extractors require
min-entropy at least Ω(log log(n)). This is in stark contrast to the existence of strong seeded
extractors that support sources of entropy k = O(log(1/ε)).
Our techniques strongly rely on coding theory. In particular, we reveal an inherent connection
between non-malleable extractors and error correcting codes, by proving a new lemma which
shows that any (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor with seed length d induces a code C ⊆ {0, 1}2k
with relative distance 0.5− 2ε and rate d−1
2k
.
1 Introduction
Randomness extractors are central objects in the theory of computation. Loosely speaking, a seeded
extractor [NZ96] is a randomized algorithm that extracts nearly uniform bits from biased random
sources, using a short seed of randomness. A non-malleable extractor [DW09] is a seeded extractor
that satisfies a very strong requirement regarding the lack of correlations of the output of the
extractor with respect to different seeds.
More accurately, a (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor is a function nmExt : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}
such that for every (weak) source X of min-entropy k and a random variable s uniformly distributed
on {0, 1}d it holds that nmExt(X, s) is ε-close to uniform, even given the seed s ∈ {0, 1}d and the
value nmExt(X, s′) for any seed s′ 6= s that is determined as an arbitrary function of s. More
generally, if nmExt(X, s) is ε-close to uniform, even given nmExt(X, s′1), . . . , nmExt(X, s′t) for t
adversarially chosen seeds such that s′i 6= s for all i ∈ [t], we say it is a (k, ε)-t-non-malleable
extractor [CRS14].
The notion of non-malleable extractors is strongly motivated by applications to privacy amplifi-
cation protocols, as well as proven to be a fundamental notion in the theory of pseudorandomness,
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as has been recently exemplified by the key role it played in the breakthrough construction of
explicit two-source extractors by Chattopadhyay and Zuckerman [CZ16]. Moreover, it also has an
important connection to Ramsey theory [BKS+05].
Non-malleable extractors can be thought of as a strengthening of the notion of strong seeded
extractors. These are functions Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1} such that for a weak source X and
seed s it holds that Ext(X, s) is ε-close to uniform, even given the seed s ∈ {0, 1}d. We stress that
this is a much weaker guarantee than that of non-malleable extractors. In particular, there exist a
blackbox transformation of seeded extractors into strong seeded extractors with roughly the same
parameters [RSW06], whereas no such transformation is known for non-malleable extractors.
By a simple probabilistic argument (see, e.g., [Vad12]), there exists a (strong) seeded extractor
Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1} for sources of seed length d = log(n) + 2 log(1/ε) + O(1) and min-
entropy k = 2 log(1/ε) +O(1). Moreover, by a long line of research, starting with the seminal work
of Nisan and Zuckerman [NZ96], and culminating with [GUV09, DKSS13, TU12] we now know of
explicit constructions that nearly achieve the optimal parameters.
For non-malleable extractors the parameters achievable by current constructions are weaker.
Dodis and Wichs showed the existence of (k, ε)-non-malleable extractors with seed length d =
log(n − k − 1) + 2 log(1/ε) + 6, and entropy k > log(d) + 2 log(1/ε) + 8; and in particular, for
k ≥ log log(n) + 2 log(1/ε). The best explicit construction, due to [Coh17] achieve seed length
d = O(log n) + O˜(log(1/ε)) for entropy k = Ω(d).
Note that while for (strong) seeded extractors there are constructions that support sources of
entropy k = 2 log(1/ε) + O(1), without any dependence on n, all known constructions of non-
malleable extractors require the entropy of the source to be at least doubly-logarithmic in n. This
naturally raises the question of whether the dependence on n is indeed necessary for non-malleable
extractors.
Question: Is it true that in any (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor the entropy k must grow with n?
In this paper we give a positive answer to this question, as well as reveal a simple yet fundamental
connection between non-malleable extractors and error-correcting codes, which we believe to be of
independent interest.
1.1 Our results
Our main result is a lower bound on the entropy required by non-malleable extractors, which
essentially matches the one obtained by the probabilistic construction. In particular, we show
that any (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor requires the source entropy k to be at least log log(n) −
(2 − oε(1)) log(1/ε). In fact, we prove the entropy lower bound for the more general notion of
t-non-malleable extractors.
Theorem 1 (Main result). Let n, k, d, t ∈ N be parameters such that t ≤ 2d/2, and let ε ∈ (0, c0)
for some absolute constant c0. If nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1} is a (k, ε)-t-non-malleable
extractor, then d > log(n−k)+2 log(1/ε)−C and k ≥ log(d)+2 log(1/ε)− log log(1/ε)+log(t)−C
for an absolute constant C.
We remark that by a recent result of Ben-Aroya et al. [BCD+17] (see Theorem 2.4), the lower
bound on d in the theorem is tight up to an additive factor of O(log(t)), and our lower bound on
k is almost tight in ε, up to an additive factor of log log(1/ε). Furthermore, since as we mentioned
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above, there exist (strong) seeded extractors for sources of entropy k = 2 log(1/ε)+O(1), Theorem 1
implies a chasm between non-malleable extractors and (strong) seeded extractors; in particular, it
rules out the possibility of transforming seeded extractors into non-malleable extractors, while
preserving the parameters.
A key technical tool that we use to prove Theorem 1 is a lemma, which shows that any non-
malleable extractor induces an error correcting code with a good distance. We believe this lemma
is of independent interest.
Lemma 2. If there exists a (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}, then
there exists an error correcting code C ⊆ {0, 1}2k with relative distance 0.5− 2ε and rate d−1
2k
.
In fact, we actually prove a more general lemma, which shows that t-non-malleable extractors
induce codes with rate that grows with t. See Section 4 for details.
1.2 Technical overview
We provide a high-level overview of the proof of our main result, the entropy lower bound in
Theorem 1, for the simple case of t = 1 (i.e., for standard non-malleable extractors). See Section 4
for the complete details of the proof for the general case. We assume basic familiarity with coding
theory and extractors (see Section 2 for the necessary preliminaries).
Consider a non-malleable extractor nmExt. Our strategy for showing a lower bound on the
source entropy of nmExt consists of the following two steps.
1. Derive a binary code C with high distance and rate from nmExt, as captured by Lemma 2.
2. Show refined bounds on the rate of binary codes with a given minimum distance, and apply
them to C to obtain an entropy lower bound.
That is, we show that if the parameters of nmExt were too good, then the implied code C would
have parameters that would violate the rate bounds in the second step. Below, we elaborate on
each of the steps.
Deriving codes from non-malleable extractors. We start with a (k, ε)-non-malleable extrac-
tor nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}. Denote K = 2k, and consider a (flat) source X, which we
view as a collection of K vectors X ⊆ {0, 1}n. We show that there is a large subset S of the seeds
such that the evaluations of nmExt, with respect to X and S, constitute a code with high distance
and rate.
More accurately, denote by w(s) the evaluation vector of nmExt on the source X and seed
s ∈ {0, 1}d; that is, w(s) = (nmExt(x, s))x∈X . We show that there exists a large subset of seeds
S ⊆ {0, 1}d such that
C def= {w(s) : s ∈ S}
is a code with distance 0.5− 2ε and rate (d− 1)/K.
As a warmup, it is instructive to note that the definition of (standard) seeded extractors only
requires that a random coordinate of a random w(s) is nearly uniformly distributed. Strong seeded
extractors also imply that most evaluation vectors are roughly balanced (i.e., contain a similar
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Figure 1: Truth table of a (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}. Rows
correspond to the D = 2d seeds. Columns correspond to all n-bit vectors, out of which we highlight
the K = 2k vectors of the flat source X. Each vector w(s) = (nmExt(x, s))x∈X consists of the values
corresponding to seed s and all vectors of X. The vectors w(si) and w(s
′
i) correspond to a pair of
“bad” seeds si, s
′
i ∈ B, and hence they are close to each other.
number of zeros and ones),1 as a strong seeded extractor needs to output a nearly uniform bit, even
given the seed (i.e., even when the identity of w(s) is known).
The key observation is that the structure of non-malleable extractors asserts that there exists
a large subset of seeds whose corresponding evaluation vectors are (close to) pairwise uncorrelated,
and hence constitute a code with large distance. Details follow.
Denote the number of seeds by D = 2d. We wish to show that there exists a subset S ⊂ {0, 1}d
of D/2 seeds whose corresponding evaluation vectors are pairwise (0.5 − 2ε)-far. Suppose the
contrary, i.e., that every set S of D/2 seeds contains at least two distinct seeds s, s′ such that
w(s) is (0.5− 2ε)-close to w(s′). This means that we can iteratively select a set of D/2 “bad” seeds
B
def
= {s1, . . . , sD/4, s′1, . . . , s′D/4} such that w(si) and w(s
′
i) are (0.5−2ε)-close in Hamming distance,
for every i ∈ [D/4]. (See Fig. 1.)
The crux is that having many pairs of correlated evaluation vectors violates the assumption that
nmExt is a non-malleable extractor. Intuitively, this holds because for each w(si) corresponding to
a bad seed si ∈ B, the output of nmExt(X, si) is biased given nmExt(X, s′i). Hence, a non-malleable
extractor cannot have a large set of bad seeds.
In Section 4.1 we make this intuition precise by exhibiting an adversarial function A : {0, 1}d →
{0, 1}d (with no fixed points) that matches pairs of bad seeds such that we can construct a distin-
guisher that, for a random variable Ud uniformly distributed on the seeds {0, 1}d, can tell apart with
confidence ε between nmExt(X,Ud) and a uniform bit, even when given nmExt(X,A(Ud)) and Ud.
Refined rate bounds for binary codes. After we derived a binary code C with distance 0.5−2ε
and rate (d − 1)/K from a (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor nmExt, we wish to apply upper bounds
on the rate of binary codes, which will in turn imply entropy lower bounds on the entropy that
nmExt requires.
1 We stress that elements of a set of nearly-balanced vectors are not necessarily pairwise-far, unless this set is a
linear space. Hence, the foregoing property of strong seeded extractors does not imply a good code in general.
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Our starting point is the state-of-the-art upper bound of McEliece, Rodemich, Rumsey and
Welch [MRR+77], which, loosely speaking, states that any binary code with relative distance 0.5−ε
has rate O(ε2 log(1/ε)) for all sufficiently small ε > 0.
Alas, the aforementioned bound does not suffice for the entropy lower bound, as we need a
quantitative bound in terms of the blocklength of the code. We, thus, prove the following theorem,
which provides the refined bound that we need.
Theorem 3. Fix a constant c ∈ (0, 1/20), and let ε ∈ (0, c). For K > c
ε2
let C ⊆ {0, 1}K be a code
with relative distance δ = 0.5− ε. Then |C| < 2 23c ε2 log(1/ε)K .
We prove Theorem 3 in Section 3, relying on the spectral approach of Navon and Samorodnit-
sky [NS09].
To conclude the proof of the entropy lower bound, we argue that if the non-malleable extractor
nmExt could support entropy that is smaller than stated in Theorem 1, then the code C we derive
via Lemma 2 would have rate that would violate the lower bound in Theorem 3.
1.3 Organization
In Section 2 we present the required preliminaries. In Section 3 we prove the refined bounds on
the rate of binary codes. Finally, in Section 4 we prove our main result, Theorem 1, as well as
Lemma 2, which captures the connection between non-malleable extractors and error correcting
codes.
2 Preliminaries
We cover the notation and basic definitions used in this paper.
2.1 Notation
For n ∈ N, we denote by [n] the set {1, . . . , n}, and by Un the random variable that is uniformly
distributed over {0, 1}n. Throughout, log(x) is defined as log2(x). The binary entropy function
H : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is given by H(x) = −x log(x)− (1− x) log(1− x). We denote by 1E the indicator
of an event E. For a finite set X, we denote by Prx∈X [·] the probability over an element x that is
chosen uniformly at random from X.
Distance. The relative Hamming distance (or just distance), over alphabet Σ, between two vec-
tors x, y ∈ Σn is denoted dist(x, y) def= |{i∈[n] : xi 6=yi}|n . If dist(x, y) ≤ ε, we say that x is ε-close to
y, and otherwise we say that x is ε-far from y. Similarly, the relative distance of x ∈ Σn from a
non-empty set S ⊆ Σn is denoted dist(x, S) def= miny∈S dist(x, y). If dist(x, S) ≤ ε, we say that x is
ε-close to S, and otherwise we say that x is ε-far from S.
The total variation distance between two random variables X1, X2 over domain Ω is denoted by
distTV(X1, X2)
def
= supS⊆Ω |Pr[X1 ∈ S]− Pr[X2 ∈ S]|, and is equivalent, up to a factor 2, to their
`1 distance ‖X1 − X2‖1 def=
∑
ω∈Ω |Pr[X1 = ω]− Pr[X2 = ω]|. We say that X1 is ε-close to X2 if
distTV(X1, X2) ≤ ε, and otherwise we say that X1 is ε-far from X2.
Remark. In order to show that X1 is ε-far from X2 it suffices to show a randomized distinguisher
D : Ω → {0, 1} such that |Pr[D(X1) = 1]− Pr[D(X2) = 1]| > ε, where the probabilities are over
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the random variables X1, X2 and the randomness of D. Note that if such randomized distinguisher
exists, then, by averaging, there is also a deterministic distinguisher with the same property. This,
naturally, defines the event SD = {ω ∈ Ω : D(ω) = 1} ⊆ Ω. for which we have distTV(X1, X2) =
supS⊆Ω |Pr[X1 ∈ S]− Pr[X2 ∈ S]| ≥ |Pr[X1 ∈ SD]− Pr[X2 ∈ SD]| > ε, and hence X1 is ε-far from
X2.
2.2 Error correcting codes
Let k, n ∈ N, and let Σ be a finite alphabet. An error correcting code is a set C ⊆ Σn, and
the elements of C are called its codewords. The parameter n is called the blocklength of C, and
k = log|Σ|(|C|) is the dimension of C. The relative distance of a code C is the minimal relative
Hamming distance between its codewords, and is denoted by δ = minc 6=c′∈C{dist(c, c′)}. The rate of
the code, measuring the redundancy of the encoding, is the ratio of its dimension and blocklength,
and is denote by ρ = k/n. If the alphabet is binary, i.e., Σ = {0, 1}, we say that C is a binary code.
2.3 Randomness extractors
We recall the standard definitions of random sources and several types of extractors, as well as
state known bounds that we will need.
Weak sources. For integers n > k, an (n, k)-random source X of min-entropy k is a random
variable taking values in {0, 1}n such that for every x ∈ {0, 1}n is holds that Pr[X = x] ≤ 2−k. An
(n, k)-random source X is flat if it is uniformly distributed over some subset S ⊆ {0, 1}n of size 2k.
It is well known [CG88] that the distribution of any (n, k)-random source is a convex combination
of distributions of flat (n, k)-random sources, and thus it typically suffices to consider flat sources.
We follow the literature, restrict our attention to flat (n, k)-random sources, and refer to them
simply as (n, k)-sources.
Seeded extractors. A function Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1} is a (k, ε)-seeded extractor if for
any (n, k)-source X, the distribution of Ext(X,Ud) is ε-close to U1, i.e., distTV(Ext(X,Ud), U1) ≤ ε.
(Recall that Um denotes the random variable that is uniformly distributed on {0, 1}m.)
A function Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1} is a (k, ε)-strong seeded extractor if for any (n, k)-
source X the distribution of (Ext(X,Ud), Ud) is ε-close to Ud+1. We will need the following lower
bound on the source entropy required by strong seeded extractors, due to Radhakrishnan and
Ta-Shma [RT00] (see also [NZ96]).
Theorem 2.1 ([RT00] Theorem 1.9). Let Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1} be a (k, ε)-strong seeded
extractor. Then, it holds that
d > log(n− k) + 2 log(1/ε)− c and k ≥ 2 log(1/ε)− c,
for some absolute constant c ∈ R.
6
Non-malleable extractors. Informally, a non-malleable extractor nmExt is a seeded extractor
that for any source X and seed s outputs a bit nmExt(X, s) that is nearly uniform even if given the
seed s and value nmExt(X, s′) for an adversarially selected seed s′.
Formally, we say that a function A : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}d is an adversarial function if it has no
fixed points, i.e., if A(s) 6= s for all s ∈ {0, 1}d. Non-malleable extractors are defined as follows.
Definition 2.2. A function nmExt : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1} is a (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor if
for any (n, k)-source X, and for any adversarial function A : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}d, it holds that the dis-
tribution of the 3-tuple (nmExt(X,Ud), nmExt(X,A(Ud)), Ud) is ε-close to (U1, nmExt(X,A(Ud)), Ud);
that is,
distTV
((
nmExt(X,Ud), nmExt(X,A(Ud)), Ud
)
,
(
U1, nmExt(X,A(Ud)), Ud
)) ≤ ε.
We will also consider the more general notion of t-non-malleable extractors, in which it is possible
to extract randomness even given multiple (namely, t) outputs of the extractor with respect to
adversarially chosen seeds.
Definition 2.3. A function nmExt : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1} is a (k, ε)-t-non-malleable extractor
if for any (n, k)-source X and for any t adversarial functions A1, . . . ,At : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}d it holds
that
distTV
((
nmExt(X,Ud), (nmExt(X,Ai(Ud)))ti=1, Ud
)
,
(
U1, (nmExt(X,Ai(Ud)))ti=1, Ud
)) ≤ ε.
We conclude this section by stating a recent result, due to Ben-Aroya et al. [BCD+17], extending
a result by Dodis and Wichs [DW09], which complements our Theorem 1 by showing that the lower
bound on the seed length d in the Theorem 1 is tight up to an additive factor of O(log(t)), and the
lower bound on k is almost tight in ε, up to an additive factor of log log(1/ε).
Theorem 2.4 ([BCD+17, DW09]). Let ε > 0 be sufficiently small, and let n, k, d, t ∈ N. There
exists a (k, ε)-t-non-malleable extractor nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1} with
d ≤ log(n) + 2 log(1/ε) + 2 log(t) +O(1) and k ≤ log(d) + 2 log(1/ε) + t+O(log(t)).
3 Refined coding bounds
As we mentioned in the technical overview (Section 1.2), we prove our entropy lower bound for
non-malleable extractors by deriving codes from extractors and bounding the rate of these codes.
To this end, in this section we prove refined bounds on the rate of binary codes with a given
minimum distance. Our starting point is the seminal result of McEliece, Rodemich, Rumsey and
Welch [MRR+77].
Theorem 3.1 ([MRR+77]). Any code C ⊆ {0, 1}n with relative distance δ ∈ (0, 12) has rate at most
H
(
1
2 −
√
δ(1− δ)
)
+ o(1), where o(1) is some function that tends to zero as n grows to infinity.
Observe that in particular, by plugging in δ = 0.5− ε for sufficiently small ε > 0, and letting n
be sufficiently large Theorem 3.1 implies that any family of binary codes with blocklength n and
relative distance 12 − ε has rate ρ = O(ε2 log(1/ε)).
However, the above does not suffice for our needs, as to prove our main result (Theorem 1) we
need a quantitative bound on n. We thus prove the following theorem, which provides the refined
bound that we seek.
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Theorem 3.2. Fix some constant c ∈ (0, 1/20), and let ε ∈ (0, c). For n > c
ε2
, let C ⊆ {0, 1}n be
a code with relative distance δ = 12 − ε. Then |C| < 2
23
c
ε2 log(1/ε)n.
Proof. The proof follows the general approach of Navon and Samorodnitsky [NS09], who provide
a spectral graph theoretic framework to prove upper bounds on the rate of binary codes.
We will need the following definition, which generalizes the notion of a maximal eigenvalue to
subsets of the hypercube.
Definition 3.3. Let A ∈ {0, 1}2n×2n be the adjacency matrix of the hypercube graph; that is,
Ax,y = 1 if and only if x ∈ {0, 1}n and y ∈ {0, 1}n differ in exactly one coordinate. Given a set
B ⊆ {0, 1}n, we define
λB = max
f :{0,1}n→R
supp(f)⊆B
〈Af, f〉
〈f, f〉 .
To better understand the definition of λB, it is convenient to consider the subgraph HB of
the hypercube graph {0, 1}n induced by the vertices in B, and observe that λB is the maximal
eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of HB. Navon and Samorodnitsky [NS09] prove the following
result.
Proposition 3.4 ([NS09, Proposition 1.1 ]). Let C ⊆ {0, 1}n be a code with relative distance δ > 0,
and let ε > 0. Suppose that for a subset B ⊆ {0, 1}n it holds that λB ≥ (1 − 2δ + ε)n. Then
|C| ≤ |B|/ε.
The foregoing theorem naturally suggest the following proof strategy: to upper bound the rate
of a binary code C with relative distance δ = 0.5− ε, it suffcies to exhibit a (small as possible) set
B ⊆ {0, 1}n whose corresponding maximal eigenvalue satisfies λB ≥ 3εn; note that the smaller B
is, the better upper bound we get on the rate of C.
Towards this end, let r ∈ [n] be a parameter to be chosen later, and let
B =
{
x ∈ {0, 1}n : |x| ∈ {r, r + 1}} .
We lower bound the maximal eigenvalue λB by showing a particular function f that is supported
on B, such that 〈Af,f〉〈f,f〉 ≥ 3εn. Specifically, for some a, b ∈ R to be chosen later, we define f :
{0, 1}n → R as
f(x) =

a if |x| = r
b if |x| = r + 1
0 otherwise .
Clearly supp(f) ⊆ B. Observe that
〈Af, f〉
〈f, f〉 =
ab
(
n
r
) · (n− r)
a2
(
n
r
)
+ b2
(
n
r+1
) = ab(nr) · (n− r)
a2
(
n
r
)
+ b2
(
n
r
) · n−rr+1 > ab · r(n− r)a2 · r + b2 · (n− r) .
By choosing r to be an integer in the interval
[
9ε2
c n,
10ε2
c n
]
and letting b = a
√
r
n we get that
2
〈Af, f〉
〈f, f〉 >
a2
√
r/n · r(n− r)
a2r + a2 · (r/n) · (n− r) =
√
rn(n− r)
2n− r > 3εn ,
2Note that by the assumption in the theorem we have 1 < ε
2
c
n < n. In particular, the interval
[
9ε2
c
n, 10ε
2
c
n
]
contains an integer.
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where the last inequality uses the assumptions that ε < c < 1/20, which implies that r ≤ 10ε2c n < n2 .
Therefore, by applying Proposition 3.4 we get that
|C| ≤ |B|
ε
=
(
n
r
)
+
(
n
r+1
)
ε
≤
(
n
r
)
· n
rε
≤ c
9ε3
(
n
10ε2
c n
)
≤ c
9ε3
( ce
10ε2
) 10ε2
c
n
< 2
23ε2 log(1/ε)
c
n ,
which concludes the proof of Theorem 3.2.
4 Proof of Theorem 1
In this section we prove Theorem 1, which we restate here with slightly more specific parameters
than those stated above.
Theorem 1 (restated): Let n, k, d, t ∈ N be parameters such that t ≤ 2d/2, and let ε ∈ (0, c0/2)
for c0 = min{1/2c, 1/20}, where c > 0 is the constant from Theorem 2.1. If nmExt : {0, 1}n ×
{0, 1}d → {0, 1} is a (k, ε)-t-non-malleable extractor, then
d > log(n− k) + 2 log(1/ε)−O(1) and k ≥ log(d) + 2 log(1/ε)− log log(1/ε) + log(t)−O(1).
We start, in Section 4.1, with the proof of Theorem 1 for the special case where t = 1 (i.e.,
for standard non-malleable extractors). Then, in Section 4.2, we provide the full proof for general
values of t.
4.1 Proof of Theorem 1 for t = 1
Following the outline provided in Section 1.2, we start the proof with the following lemma, showing
that any non-malleable extractor induces an error correcting code with good distance.
Lemma 4.1 (Lemma 2, restated). If there exists a (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor nmExt : {0, 1}n×
{0, 1}d → {0, 1}, then there exists an error correcting code C ⊆ {0, 1}2k with relative distance
0.5− 2ε and rate d−1
2k
.
Proof. Let nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1} be a (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor, and let X be
an (n, k)-source. That is, X ⊆ {0, 1}n is a collection of K = 2k vectors, which we denote by
X = {x1, . . . , xK} ⊆ {0, 1}n. For each seed s ∈ {0, 1}d, let w(s) ∈ {0, 1}K be the K-bit evaluation
vector defined as
w(s) =
(
nmExt(xi, s)
)
i∈{1,...,K} .
We claim that the (multi-)set {w(s) : s ∈ {0, 1}d} ⊆ {0, 1}K contains an error correcting code
C ⊆ {0, 1}K with relative distance 0.5− 2ε and rate d−1K .
Claim 4.2. There exists a subset S ⊆ {0, 1}d of size 2d−1 such that for every two distinct s, s′ ∈ S
it holds that dist(w(s), w(s
′)) ≥ 0.5− 2ε.
Proof. Suppose towards contradiction that for every subset S′ ⊆ {0, 1}d of size at least 2d−1 there
exist distinct seeds s, s′ ∈ S′ such that dist(w(s), w(s′)) < 0.5 − 2ε. We show below that this
contradicts the assumption that nmExt is a (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor.
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Indeed, by the assumption, we can find s1, s
′
1 ∈ {0, 1}d such that dist(w(s1), w(s
′
1)) < 0.5 − 2ε.
Then, we can remove s1, s
′
1 from {0, 1}d, and apply the assumption again, to obtain s2, s′2 ∈
{0, 1}d \ {s1, s′1} such that dist(w(s2), w(s
′
2)) < 0.5− 2ε. By iteratively repeating this argument D/4
times, where D = 2d, we obtain D/4 pairs of distinct elements (s1, s
′
1), . . . , (sD/4, s
′
D/4) such that
∀j ∈ [D/4] dist
(
w(sj), w(s
′
j)
)
< 0.5− 2ε . (1)
Let B = {sj , s′j : j ∈ [D/4]} ⊆ {0, 1}d denote the set of all such “bad” seeds, and define
an adversarial function A : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}d that matches each pair of bad seeds by mapping
A(sj) = s′j and A(s′j) = sj for all j ∈ [D/4], and defining A(s) arbitrarily for all other seeds s /∈ B.
Next we prove that nmExt is not a (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor by arguing that the distribution
of the random variable consisting of the 3-tuple (nmExt(X,Ud), nmExt(X,A(Ud)), Ud) is ε-far from
(U1, nmExt(X,A(Ud)), Ud), where recall that Um denotes the random variable that is uniformly
distributed over {0, 1}m. Indeed, consider the following distinguisher D : {0, 1}×{0, 1}×{0, 1}d →
{0, 1}, defined as
D(b, b′, s) =
{
1b=b′ , if s ∈ B
U1, otherwise .
Clearly Pr[D(U1, nmExt(X,A(Ud)), Ud) = 1] = 0.5. On the other hand, by Eq. (1), for s sampled
from Ud we have
Pr[D(nmExt(X, s), nmExt(X,A(s)), s) = 1] ≥ (0.5 + 2ε) Pr[s ∈ B] + 0.5 Pr[s /∈ B] ≥ 0.5 + ε ,
thus contradicting the assumption that nmExt is a (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor. This concludes
the proof of Claim 4.2.
Therefore, by Claim 4.2 there exists a set C = {w(s) : s ∈ S} ⊆ {0, 1}K of size 2d−1 such that
for every x, y ∈ C it holds that dist(x, y) ≥ 0.5− 2ε, i.e., C is an error correcting code with relative
distance 0.5− 2ε and rate d−1
2k
, which completes the proof of Lemma 4.1.
By applying the bound from Theorem 3.2 to the code obtained in Lemma 4.1, we prove Theo-
rem 1 for the case of t = 1.
Proof of Theorem 1 for t = 1. Since every non-malleable extractor is, in particular, a strong seeded
extractor, then by Theorem 2.1 it holds that the seed length is d > log(n− k) + 2 log(1/ε)− c, as
required. Furthermore, Theorem 2.1 also implies that
k ≥ 2 log(1/ε)− c. (2)
By Lemma 4.1, if nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1} is a (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor, then
there exists an error correcting code C ⊆ {0, 1}2k with relative distance 0.5− 2ε and rate d−1
2k
.
Next, we wish to apply Theorem 3.2 to the code C. Recall that by the assumption it holds that
ε < c0 and c0 < 1/2
c, and observe that by Eq. (2) we have 2k ≥ 2−c
ε2
> c0
ε2
. Therefore, by applying
Theorem 3.2, with respect to c0 (recall that c0 < 1/20) and 2ε < c0 we get that
2d−1 ≤ |C| < 2 23c0 ·(2ε)2 log(1/2ε)2k ,
and thus k ≥ log(d) + 2 log(1/ε)− log log(1/ε)−O(1), as required.
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4.2 Proof of Theorem 1 for general t
Next, we extend the idea presented in Section 4.1 to larger values of t. The key step is the following
lemma.
Lemma 4.3. If there exists a (k, ε)-t-non-malleable extractor nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1},
then, there exists an error correcting code C ⊆ {0, 1}2k with relative distance 0.5 − 2ε such that
|C| ≥ (2d−1/t)bt/2c.
Proof. Let nmExt : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1} be a (k, ε)-t-non-malleable extractor. Similarly to the
proof of Lemma 4.1, we set K = 2k, and let X be an (n, k)-source, which we view as a collection
of vectors X = {x1, . . . , xK} ⊆ {0, 1}n. For each seed s ∈ {0, 1}d, let w(s) ∈ {0, 1}K be the
K-bit evaluation vector, defined as w(s) =
(
nmExt(xi, s)
)
i∈{1,...,K}. Hereafter, all sums involving
binary vectors are summations over GF(2). For x ∈ {0, 1}n, we denote by weight(x) the (absolute)
Hamming weight of x.
Whereas before, in the proof of Lemma 4.1, we showed that the multi-set of evaluation vectors{
w(s) : s ∈ {0, 1}d} ⊆ {0, 1}K simply contains an error correcting code with good parameters, here
we will derive our code by considering all GF(2)-linear combinations of bt/2c elements of a carefully
selected subset of the evaluation vectors.
Towards that end, the next claim shows that there exists a large subset of seeds such that
any linear combination of t+ 1 of the evaluation vectors that corresponds to these seeds has large
Hamming weight.
Claim 4.4. There is a subset S ⊆ {0, 1}d of size 2d−1 such that for every subset I ⊆ S of size
|I| ≤ t+ 1 it holds that weight (∑s∈I w(s)) ≥ (0.5− 2ε)K.
Proof. Assume towards contradiction that for every subset S′ ⊆ {0, 1}d of size at least 2d−1 there
are t′ ≤ t+ 1 distinct seeds s1 . . . , st′ ∈ S′ such that
Pr
x∈X
 t′∑
j=1
nmExt (x, sj) = 0
 < 0.5− 2ε .
We show below that this contradicts the assumption that nmExt is a (k, ε)-t-non-malleable extractor.
By our assumption, there is a subset of seeds S1 ⊆ {0, 1}d for which there exists I1 ⊆ S1 of size
|I1| = t′1 ≤ t such that weight
(∑
s∈I1 w
(s)
)
< (0.5 − 2ε)K. We remove I1 from {0, 1}d, and apply
the assumption again to obtain I2 ⊆ {0, 1}d of size |I2| = t′2 ≤ t+1 such that weight
(∑
s∈I2 w
(s)
)
<
(0.5 − 2ε)K. We then remove I2 from {0, 1}d \ I1, and apply the assumption again with respect
to {0, 1}d \ (I1 ∪ I2). By repeating this argument as long as | ∪j Ij | < 2d−1, we obtain R disjoint
subsets I1, . . . , IR, where the size of each Ij is t
′
j ≤ t+ 1, such that
∑R
j=1 |Ij | ≥ 2d−1 and
weight
∑
s∈Ij
w(s)
 < (0.5− 2ε)K , (3)
for all j ∈ [R]. Analogously to the proof of Lemma 4.1, the set I1 ∪ . . . ∪ IT consists of the “bad
seeds” that correspond to evaluation vectors whose (t+ 1)-element linear combinations are of low
weight.
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To prove that the foregoing collection of “bad seeds” violates the assumption that nmExt is
a (k, ε)-t-non-malleable extractor, we exhibit t adversarial functions A1, . . . ,At : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}d
(with no fixed points) for which there exists a function that distinguishes between the random
variables consisting of the (t+ 2)-tuples(
nmExt(X,Ud),
(
nmExt
(
X,A`(Ud)
))
`∈[t]
, Ud
)
and
(
U1,
(
nmExt
(
X,A`(Ud)
))
`∈[t]
, Ud
)
with confidence ε, where recall that Um denotes the random variable that is uniformly distributed
over {0, 1}m.
We define the family {A`}`∈[t] in the natural way, by mapping each of the bad seeds to the set
of seeds with which its linear combination is a low weight vector. That is, for each j ∈ [R] let
Ij = {s1, . . . , st′j}, where t′j ≤ t+ 1. Then, for all ` ∈ [t] we define
A`(si) =
{
si+` (mod t′j), for si ∈ Ij , j ∈ [R]
arbitrary, for s ∈ {0, 1}d \ (∪j∈[R]Ij) .
Note that by definition of the A`’s, for all j ∈ [R] and s ∈ Ij it holds that {s}∪{A`(s)}`∈[t′j−1] = Ij ,
and so, by Eq. (3) we have that
Pr
x∈X
nmExt(x, s) = t′j−1∑
i=1
nmExt
(
x,Ai(s)
) = weight
(∑
s∈Ij w
(s)
)
K
< (0.5− 2ε)K .
Next, we define the distinguisher D : {0, 1} × {0, 1}t × {0, 1}d → {0, 1} as
D(b, b1, . . . , bt, s) =
1b=
∑
i∈[t′
j
−1] bi , if s ∈ Ij for some j ∈ [R]
U1, otherwise .
Clearly Pr
[
D
(
U1,
(
nmExt(X,A`(Ud))
)
`∈[t], Ud
)
= 1
]
= 0.5. On the other hand, for s sampled from
Ud we have
Pr
[
D
(
nmExt(X, s),
(
nmExt(X,A`(s))
)
`∈[t], s
)
= 1
]
≥ (0.5 + 2ε) Pr [s ∈ ∪j∈[R]Ij]+ 0.5 Pr [s ∈ {0, 1}d \ ∪j∈[R]Ij] ≥ 0.5 + ε ,
thus contradicting the assumption that nmExt is a (k, ε)-t-non-malleable extractor. This concludes
the proof of Claim 4.4.
Let S ⊆ {0, 1}d be the set guaranteed by Claim 4.4, and consider the code
C def=
{∑
s∈I
w(s) : I ⊆ S, |I| ≤ bt/2c ⊆ {0, 1}K
}
.
Note that for D = 2d we have |C| ≥ (D/4bt/2c) ≥ (D/2t)bt/2c. By the guarantee of Claim 4.4, for every
distinct x, y ∈ C it holds that dist(x, y) ≥ 0.5 − 2ε; that is C ⊆ {0, 1}K is an error correcting code
with relative distance 0.5− 2ε, which completes the proof of Lemma 4.3.
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We prove Theorem 1 by applying the bound from Theorem 3.2 to the code obtained in Lemma 4.3,
analogously to the way we proved the theorem for the restricted case of t = 1 before.
Proof of Theorem 1 (general case). Since every t-non-malleable extractor is, in particular, a strong
seeded extractor, then by Theorem 2.1 it holds that the seed length is d > log(n−k)+2 log(1/ε)−c,
as required. Furthermore, Theorem 2.1 also implies that k ≥ 2 log(1/ε)− c.
By Lemma 4.3, if nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1} is a (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor, then
there exists an error correcting code C ⊆ {0, 1}2k with relative distance 0.5 − 2ε such that |C| ≥
(2d−1/t)bt/2c.
We wish to apply Theorem 3.2 to the code C. Recall that by the assumption it holds that ε < c0
and c0 < 1/2
c, and observe that according to the bound on k given by Theorem 2.1, we have that
2k ≥ 2−c
ε2
> c0
ε2
. Therefore, by applying Theorem 3.2, with respect to c0 (recall that c0 < 1/20) and
2ε < c0, we get that
(2d−1/t)bt/2c ≤ |C| < 2 23c0 ·(2ε)2 log(1/2ε)2k ,
and by the assumption that log(t) < d/2 we get that
23
c0
· (2ε)2 log(1/2ε)2k ≥ (d− 2− log(t)) · bt/2c ≥ Ω(d · t) .
This implies that k ≥ log(d) + log(t) + 2 log(1/ε)− log log(1/ε)−O(1), as required.
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